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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
GREGORY N. OLIVER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 890625-CA 
Priority No. 2 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Mr. Oliver's right to trial preparation was violated when 
trial counsel failed to prepare for trial and when the trial court 
refused to continue the trial despite the fact that counsel had done 
no formal trial preparation. In the event that this Court is 
dissatisfied with the record proof to this effect, Mr. Oliver asks 
this Court to remand this case to the district court for an 
evidentiary hearing. 
The value of the property underlying the felony theft 
conviction was not established properly. The police report 
containing the value of the property was neither offered nor 
admitted into evidence. Mr. Spielmans had no memory of the value of 
the property, and there was inadequate foundation laid to establish 
the police report as a past recollection recorded. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
MR. OLIVER'S RIGHT TO TRIAL PREPARATION WAS VIOLATED. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO GRANT THE MOTION FOR A CONTINUANCE 
VIOLATED MR. OLIVER'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS. 
The State indicates that Mr. Oliver is not in a position to 
challenge the trial court's failure to grant a continuance, because 
trial counsel did not fulfill the requirements set forth in State v. 
Creviston, 646 P.2d 750 (Utah 1982). On the contrary, to the extent 
possible given that trial counsel had done no formal trial 
preparation, trial counsel met the Creviston standards. 
In Creviston, the court explained that when a trial court 
denies a motion for continuance, an abuse of discretion "may1 be 
found where a party has made timely objections, given necessary 
notice and made a reasonable effort to have the trial date reset for 
good cause." Id. at 752 (emphasis added). 
In the instant case, trial counsel objected at the 
beginning of proceedings on Tuesday morning (T. 7). On the day 
before, the prosecutor had agreed to leave the plea bargain offer 
open until 7:00 p.m. (T. 3). Mr. Oliver had agreed to accept the 
plea bargain offer, and it was trial counsel's understanding the day 
befcre trial began that the case would be disposed of through a plea 
(T. 4). While the record is not clear as to why the plea was not 
entered, the record is clear that defense counsel had relied on the 
intended plea and had not prepared to defend Mr. Oliver (T. 3-9). 
This objection was as timely as possible and supported by good 
1. The use of the word "may" indicates that the 
circumstances discussed in Creviston are not the exclusive 
circumstances in which an abuse of discretion may be found. 
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cause: Mr. Oliver's constitutional right to a prepared defense. 
See Point I of Appellant's opening brief. 
The State also objects to Mr. Oliver's failure to meet 
additional standards set forth in Creviston. In Creviston, the 
court detailed the proffer required to support a motion for 
continuance based on the need for an additional witness: 
When a defendant in a criminal action moves for a 
continuance in order to procure the testimony of 
an absent witness, such a defendant must show 
that the testimony sought is material and 
admissible, that the witness could actually be 
produced, that the witness could be produced 
within a reasonable time, and that due diligence 
has been exercised before the request for a 
continuance. 
Id. at 752. 
Trial counsel's motion for a continuance in this case was 
not based on the need to procure additional witnesses. The motion 
was based on the fact that trial counsel had done no formal trial 
preparation. This aspect of Creviston, thus, is inapposite to this 
case, wherein trial counsel was apparently not yet in a position to 
identify necessary witnesses. 
In sum, Mr. Oliver's due process right to preparation of 
the defense case was violated when the trial court forced Mr. Oliver 
to proceed to trial despite trial counsel's admission that he had 
done no formal preparation. See Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207 
(Utah 1983). 
B. DEFENSE COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO PREPARE MR. OLIVER'S DEFENSE 
VIOLATED MR. OLIVER'S RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
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The State concludes that Mr. Oliver's contentions 
concerning what trial counsel might have done in preparation of 
Mr. Oliver's defense fail to establish deficient performance of 
defense counsel and prejudice to Mr. Oliver. 
Under governing precedents, failure to investigate 
prospective defense witnesses (which apparently occurred in this 
case, given trial counsel's admission that he had done no formal 
trial preparation) constitutes deficient performance. Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984); State v. Tempiin, 805 P.2d 
182, 188 (Utah 1990); State v. Crestani, 771 P.2d 1085, 1091 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989). 
The State complains that Mr. Oliver's arguments concerning 
the prejudicial impact of trial counsel's deficient performance are 
speculative and lcicking in record support. Such complaints would be 
true in every case in which the ineffective assistance of counsel 
issue is raised for the first time on appeal. In Hurst v. Cook, 777 
P.2d 1029 (Utah 1989), in discussing the procedural standards 
governing postconviction relief petitions, the court recognized the 
difficulty of raising for the first time on appeal an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim involving the failure to prepare the 
defense case. The court stated, 
Numerous cases have arisen that have called 
in question the fundamental justice of a 
conviction where the issue was not, or could not 
be, dealt with on direct appeal. Prime examples 
involve cases in which issues arise outside the 
record, e.g., the subsequent discovery of the 
suppression of exculpatory evidence; the 
ineffective assistance of counsel, especially in 
the investigation and preparation of a case; the 
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discovery of new exculpatory evidence; and fraud 
committed on the court by knowing use of false 
evidence. 
Id. at 1036 n.6 (citations omitted). 
Despite the difficulty of raising such claims for the first 
time on appeal, the Utah Supreme Court has indicated that the claims 
should be raised for the first time on appeal when possible. See 
Jensen v. Deland. 795 P.2d 619, 621 (Utah 1989). 
In an effort to raise the ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim thoroughly in this appeal, on January 22, 1991, appellate 
counsel for Mr. Oliver moved this Court to suspend the rules and 
remand this case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing. The 
memorandum supporting that motion is in Appendix 2 to Appellant's 
Opening Brief. This Court denied the motion on January 31, 1991. 
In the event that this Court finds that the record is 
inadequate to establish the ineffective assistance claim or to 
establish the prejudice caused by the trial court's refusal to grant 
the continuance, Mr. Oliver renews his motion to remand this case to 
the trial court. See Jensen v. Deland, 795 P.2d 619, 621 (Utah 
1989) (on appeal from denial of petition for postconviction relief, 
the Utah Supreme Court remanded the case to the district court for 
an evidentiary hearing disposing of the ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim); Constitution of Utah, Article I § 12 and 
Article VIII § 5 (providing constitutional rights to appeal). 
II. 
THE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY 
NECESSARY TO THE FELONY THEFT CONVICTION 
WAS NOT ESTABLISHED PROPERLY. 
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The State does not dispute Mr. Oliver's contention that the 
trial court clearly erred in finding that Mr. Spielmans' memory 
concerning the value of the property stolen was refreshed by 
reference to the police report. As an alternative reason to support 
the trial court's refusal to reduce the theft charge to a 
misdemeanor theft charge, the State argues that the value of the 
property was properly established when Mr. Spielmans indicated that 
he had forgotten the value of the property taken, but was confident 
that the police report accurately reflected what he had told Officer 
Matthews about the value of the property, regardless of what the 
police report actually said. 
The prosecutor gave Mr. Spielmans the police report in an 
effort to refresh his recollection of the value of a ring that was 
taken (T. 49). Mr. Spielmans first indicated that the police report 
had refreshed his recollection (T. 50). However, when the 
prosecutor then asked him the value of the ring, he stated, 
I really can't recall. It states $200 on 
there. That's what I said. If it says $200 on 
there, that's what I said. 
(T. 50). 
Mr. Spielmans had no personal knowledge of the value of the 
ring supporting the felony theft charge. Under Utah Rule of 
Evidence 602, therefore, he was not competent to testify concerning 
the value of the ring. 
There were two evidentiary avenues that the State could 
have pursued in seeking to establish the value of the ring. One 
avenue which the State might have pursued was to establish the 
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admissibility of the police report under Utah Rule of Evidence 
801(d)(1)(A), which provides, 
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A 
statement is not hearsay if: 
(1) Prior statement by witness. The 
declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and 
is subject to cross-examination concerning the 
statement and the statement is (A) inconsistent 
with his testimony or the witness denies having 
made the statement or has forgotten[.] 
The State did not seek to admit the police report 
containing the statement. On appeal, the State argues, "Assuming 
the police report had been offered, the trial court could have 
properly received it into evidence pursuant to the nonhearsay rule 
[801(d)(1)(A)]." Brief of Appellee at 22. Had the State sought to 
admit the police report, trial counsel for Mr. Oliver would have had 
the opportunity to cross-examine Officer Matthews concerning the 
accuracy of this aspect of his report.2 Mr. Spielmans' confidence 
in whatever Officer Matthews put in the police report is no 
substitute for the police report and the foundation necessary to its 
admission. 
The other avenue the State may have pursued is the reading 
of the police report into the record after foundation had been laid 
to establish the applicability of the past recollection recorded 
exception to the hearsay rule. Utah Rule of Evidence 803(5) allows 
2. Recall that Officer Matthews testified inconsistently 
with the report concerning how many witnesses he had tainted with 
the one photo mug shot show up, and maintained that his testimony 
was accurate when trial counsel noted the discrepancy between the 
testimony and the police report (T. 121-123)). 
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for the admission of recordings of past recollection. The rule sets 
forth the foundation the State failed to lay in this case: 
The following are not excluded by the 
hearsay rule, even though the declarant is 
available as a witness: 
.... 
(5) Recorded recollection. A memorandum or 
record concerning a matter about which a witness 
once had knowledge but now has insufficient 
recollection to enable him to testify fully and 
accurately, shown to have been made or adopted by 
the witness when the matter was fresh in his 
memory and to reflect that knowledge correctly. 
If admitted, the memorandum or record may be read 
into evidence but may not itself be received as 
an exhibit unless offered by an adverse party. 
(emphasis added). 
Because the State failed to establish that Mr. Spielmans 
made or adopted the police report containing the statements 
concerning the value of the property, there was insufficient 
foundation to admit the statement as a recorded recollection. 
The State's observation that Mr. Oliver does not contest 
the value of the ring is accurate and understandable, given that the 
ring was not produced in court and Mr. Oliver testified that he did 
not steal it. M>re importantly, Mr. Oliver has no burden to 
establish the value of the ring. It was the State's burden to prove 
each element of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
the State failed to sustain that burden on the felony theft charge. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse Mr. Oliver's convictions and 
order a new trial, specifying that the theft charge must be 
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decreased to the misdemeanor level. In the event that this Court is 
not satisfied with the record of the prejudice caused to Mr. Oliver 
by the ineffective assistance of counsel and/or failure of the trial 
court to grant the continuance, Mr. Oliver requests this Court to 
remand the case for an evidentiary hearing. 
Respectfully submitted this D day of June, 1991, 
EHrzABEM H&^BROOK 
Attorney forlMr. Oliver 
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